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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction is invoked pursuant to §78-2-2(3)(j) Utah 
Code Annotated (1953 as amended). Jurisdiction is not 
disputed. 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
Pursuant to Rule 24(b) of the Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure, respondent The Home Insurance Company disputes the 
description of the issues presented for review as contained in 
appellees' brief. It is submitted that the issues for review 
are as follows: 
1. Did the trial court commit error in ruling as a matter 
of law that Holiday Rent-A-Car and Patricia Christiansen are 
not insureds under the policy issued by The Home Insurance 
Company? 
2. Was the trial court correct in ruling that damages for 
breach of contract are limited to the amount of compensatory 
damages actually sustained by Holiday Rent-A-Car? 
This appeal follows the granting of summary judgment 
pursuant to Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
Accordingly, the this courtfs review is to determine whether 
the record on appeal demonstrates genuine facts that would 
preclude summary judgment as a matter of law. Utah State Coal, 
of Sr. Citizens v. UP&L, 776 P.2d 632 (Utah 1989). 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES 
Determinative statutes are Utah Code Annotated §§35-1-60 
and 31A-1-301(42)(43) . Because of length of the text of these 
statutes, they have been set forth in their entirety in the 
Addendum. 
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A determinative rule is Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. This is also fully set forth in the Addendum, 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
1. Nature of the Case. 
In one of two cases consolidated below, The Home Insurance 
Company was defendant in an action for fraud, misrepresenta-
tion, insurer bad faith, infliction of emotional distress, 
breach of contract and breach of fiduciary duties. 
2. Course of Proceedings Below. 
The complaint against The Home Insurance Company was 
commenced in the Third Judicial District Court as Civil No. 
C86-7570 (R). It was eventually consolidated with a previous 
and related action bearing Civil No. C81-4453 (R2). 
The previous action was a personal injury claim by 
Patricia Christiansen against Holiday Rent-A-Car. A third-
party action was brought by Holiday against Airport Shuttle 
Parking alleging breach of an agreement to provide liability 
insurance. Airport was insured by Home under a general 
liability policy. 
The third-party action proceeded to trial where it was 
determined that Airport had agreed to provide such liability 
insurance. Post-trial motions resulted in an award of damages 
in the amount of $15,000 plus attorney's fees. This is the 
amount Holiday paid in settlement to Christiansen of the 
personal injury lawsuit. 
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The initial action, as to the third-party claim, was 
appealed in Christiansen v. Holiday Rent-A-Car, 742 P. 2d 77 
(Utah 1987). This court ruled that an issue of fact existed as 
to whether Holiday was insured under Home's policy. The case 
was remanded for a determination. 
Upon remand consolidation of the two cases occurred. 
Cross-motions for summary judgment were filed " and District 
Judge Scott Daniels ruled that Holiday was not an insured under 
the Home policy and granted dismissal of the complaint by 
Christiansen individually and as assignee of Holiday. This 
appeal followed. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
This statement of relevant facts is submitted pursuant to 
Rule 24(a)(7) and in conformity with Rule 24(e). Record 
citations "R" are to District Court Case No. C81-4453. "R2" 
refers to case No., C86-7570. 
a. The Parties. 
1. Appellant Patricia Christiansen (Christiansen) 
brought an action for personal injuries against Holiday Rent-A-
Car (Holiday). (Complaint in Civil No. C81-4453, R 2-3.) 
2. At the time she sustained her injuries Christiansen 
was an employee of Airport Shuttle Parking (Airport). 
(Deposition of Christiansen, pp. 7-8, R2 487-8. Also, 
Complaint, R 2-3.) 
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3. Holiday was a car rental company which leased a 
portion of Airport's premises at its facility in Salt Lake 
City, (Complaint in Civil No. C81-4453, R 2-3.) 
4. It was on the portion of the business premises leased 
by Holiday that Christiansen's accident occurred. (Complaint, 
R 2-3. ) 
5. Third-party defendant and respondent Airport was in 
the business of providing short-term and long-term parking. 
Approximately two months before Christiansen's accident, 
Airport leased a portion of its premises to Holiday pursuant to 
a written lease agreement. (Lease, R2 18.) 
6. Defendant and respondent Home Insurance Company 
(Home) is a multi-lines insurer authorized to do business in 
the State of Utah. Home issued a comprehensive general 
liability policy to Airport. (Complaint in Civil No. C86-7570, 
R2 2-32. ) 
b. Procedural Facts. 
7. On June 1, 1981, Christiansen commenced an action for 
personal injuries against Holiday arising from her accident on 
the premises Holiday leased from Airport. The date of her 
accident was February 29, 1980. (Complaint, R 2-3.) 
8. On or about February 22, 1982, Holiday brought a 
third-party action against Airport. Holiday alleged that 
Airport had agreed to obtain insurance for the benefit of 
Holiday and that Airport "failed to obtain said insurance, 
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thereby breaching the agreement ..." (Third-Party Complaint, 
R 108-113.) 
9. On September 30, 1982, a settlement was entered into 
between Christiansen and Holiday. The agreement provided that 
Holiday would pay $15,000 to Christiansen for her personal 
injury claim. Holiday also assigned its claims against Airport 
and Home to Christiansen. In return Christiansen agreed not to 
execute judgment against Holiday beyond $15,000. Neither 
Airport nor Home were parties to the settlement agreement. 
(Settlement Agreement of September 30, 1982, R 190-193.) 
10. Judgment was entered on October 1, 1982, by Judge 
Philip R. Fishier of the Third District against Holiday in the 
amount of $246,000 pursuant to the settlement and stipulated 
damages between Christiansen and Holiday. (R 197-198.) 
11. The action by Christiansen against Holiday was 
bifurcated and proceeded to trial on the third-party claim by 
Holiday against Airport for alleged breach of contract to 
provide insurance. A jury determined that Airport had agreed 
to provide liability insurance for the benefit of Holiday. 
(Jury Verdict, R 24 8.) 
12. Following the jury verdict, the trial court, through 
Judge Scott Daniels, set damages at $15,000 plus attorney's 
fees in favor of Holiday and against Airport. (Memorandum 
Decision of September 23, 1983, R 485-8.) 
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13. Christiansen appealed the damage award of Judge 
Daniels. Christiansen v. Holiday Rent-A-Car, 742 P.2d 77 (Utah 
1987) . 
14. While Civil No. C81-4453 was on appeal, Christiansen 
commenced a separate action against Airport and, for the first 
time, named the Home Insurance Company. (Complaint, R2 2-32.) 
15. All defendants, except for Home, were dismissed from 
this new action by order of District Judge Dennis Frederick. 
That order has not been appealed. (R2 139-40.) 
16. This court then issued its opinion, holding that 
before damages could be set, it must first be determined 
whether or not Holiday was an insured under the policy issued 
by Home. (See 742 P.2d at 79.) 
17. Following remand to the trial court, the initial 
action (Civil No. C81-4453) and the action against Home (Civil 
No. C86-7570) were consolidated. (R2 462-4.) 
c. Facts Pertinent to Appeal. 
The facts set forth above hopefully provide an adequate 
background for the Court. Those facts specifically relevant to 
the present appeal, and which are established by the record, 
are as follows: 
18. Christiansen was, at the time of her accident, an 
employee of Airport. (Christiansen Deposition, pp. 7-8, R2 
487-8.) 
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19. Christiansen has not asserted a claim for personal 
injuries against Airport in either action. (Complaints, R 2-3, 
R2 2-32. ) 
20. Home issued a comprehensive general liability policy 
to Airport, Policy No. BOP-863546. Named insureds are Airport 
and its principals, Rex Howell and Harold Hinckley. (R2 194-
219, 536-542.) 
21. Christiansen does not claim to be a named insured. 
As stated in her answers to Request for Admissions: 
Plaintiffs, excluding Christiansen# claim 
they are insureds under the [Home] policy 
(See Answers to Request for 
Admissions, dated July 31, 1987.) 
(emphas is added.) 
(R2 422.) 
22. Christiansen admitted to having no knowledge or 
information with regard to the insurance in effect for her 
employer, Airport, and whether it extended to include Holiday 
Rent-A-Car as a named insured. (Deposition of Christiansen, 
pp. 31-33, R2 489.) 
23. The principals of Airport; Rex Howell and Harold 
Hinckley, stated in their respective affidavits that they never 
procured nor intended to procure liability insurance on behalf 
of Holiday. (Affidavit of Harold Hinckley, R2 219, and 
Affidavit of Rex Howell, R2 221.) 
24. The principals of Holiday admitted that they had no 
contacts or dealings with agents or representatives of Home 
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prior to Christiansen's accident of February 29, 1980. 
(Deposition of David Lingard, pp. 23-24, 25-26, R2 506-7; 
Deposition of Don Maw, pp. 7-8, R2 508-9; Affidavit of Craig 
Lingard, R2 510; testimony of John Lingard in trial proceedings 
of Civil No. C81-4453, pp. 8-10, 29, 39, R2 513-20.) 
25. No application for insurance was submitted by or on 
behalf of Holiday to Home. (Affidavits of Howell, R2 219, 
Hinckley, R2 221, and Affidavit of James Guthrie, R2 258-60, 
also Deposition of Gene Denning, pp. 52-53, R2 530.) 
26. Mr. Gene Denning, an independent insurance agent, who 
acted as broker for Howell and Hinckley, testified that 
suggestions made to Howell and Hinckley as to how they might 
extend the existing policy with Home to cover tenants such as 
Holiday, was not observed. The language Denning suggested for 
this purpose was not incorporated into the written lease 
between Airport and Holiday. (Deposition of Gene Denning, pp. 
21-22, 30, 32, 41-42, 60, 61, R2 521-35.) 
27. Home has never disputed that it insured Airport to 
the extent of coverage provided by its policy. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The trial court correctly dismissed the complaint of 
Christiansen in her individual and assignee capacities. The 
theories contained in said complaint are predicated on an 
insured-insurer relationship between Home and either Holiday or 
Christiansen. In the trial court as here, there has been no 
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showing to support such a relationship. Likewise, no such 
relationship can be implied from statements or conduct of Home 
representatives or its attorneys, nor from the contractual 
liability coverage afforded by Home's policy. Finally, the 
trial court correctly measured damages as limited to the amount 
actually incurred by Holiday in consequence of Airportfs 
failure to obtain insurance. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I, 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DISMISSED THE 
COMPLAINT AGAINST HOME. 
Home will demonstrate that no facts existed before the 
trial court and that none have been shown in this appeal to 
support a finding that either Christiansen or Holiday were 
insureds of Home. As a matter of law, the claims asserted by 
Christiansen, individually and as assignee of Holiday, fail for 
lack of privity of contract. 
It will also be shown that no contract of insurance can be 
implied as a matter of law from alleged representations or 
conduct made during the course of this litigation. 
A. No Facts Have Been Produced Showing a Contract of 
Insurance Between Home and Christiansen or Holiday, 
Despite the fervor of Christiansen's appeal, no facts have 
been produced below or in the present appeal in support of her 
claim that either she or Holiday are insureds under Home's 
policy. In fact, Christiansen has previously admitted that she 
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does not claim to be an insured and her brief in this matter 
admits that Holiday is not an insured of Home. After 
establishing that there is no basis for an express contract of 
insurance, it will be shown that there can be no implied 
contract of insurance contrary to the arguments of appellants, 
1. No Express Contract of Insurance Exists Between 
Home and Christiansen or Holiday. 
Christiansen and Holiday claim to be "insureds" under the 
policy issued by Home to Airport. The policy in question is 
No. BOP-863546. The only named insureds under said policy are 
Rex Howell, Harold Hinckley and the partnership -- Airport 
Shuttle Parking. Christiansen admitted in responses to 
Requests for Admissions that she does not claim to be an 
insured under the Home policy: 
REQUEST NO. 1: Admit that no policy 
of insurance has been issued by defendant 
Home Insurance Company with any of the 
above-named plaintiffs, jointly or 
severally, as named insured on said 
policy. 
RESPONSE: Admits and denies as 
follows: 
(a) Plaintiffs do not know if Home 
Insurance, or its agent Gene Denning, made 
entries indicating plaintiffs, excluding 
Christiansen, were named, designated or 
noted as insureds by Home under its 
existing premises liability coverage for 
Airport Shuttle. 
(b) Plaintiffs had not received any 
document naming them as insureds under the 
said policy. 
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(c) Plaintiffs, excluding 
Christiansen, claim they are insureds 
under thus said policy . . . . (emphasis 
added.) 
(R2 422.) 
In her deposition Christiansen admits to having no 
knowledge or information as to what, if any, insurance was in 
effect on behalf of her employer at the time of her accident 
and whether it extended to others such as Holiday. (Deposition 
of Christiansen, pp. 31-33, R2 489.) There is no evidence that 
Christiansen ever submitted an application for insurance to 
Home. (Affidavit of James Guthrie, R2 258-60.) Indeed, if 
Christiansen were an insured of Home, she would have no reason 
to take an assignment from Holiday of rights or claims against 
Home. 
In her brief Christiansen fails to point to any facts in 
support of a claim to be insured by Home. Her brief merely 
argues that Home's policy "provides coverage for Holiday as to 
plaintiff's claim of bodily injury". (Brief of Appellants, pp. 
18-26. ) 
The same conclusion applies to Holiday. That is, no 
evidence can support a finding that Home insured Holiday. It 
is apparent that Christiansen still confuses "coverage" with 
the existence of an insured-insurer relationship. 
At page 24 of appellants' brief, the following concession 
is made: 
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While it is correct that Holiday was not a 
"named" or "additional insured" it was a 
party to which the limits of the policy 
attached and for which Home could either 
pay the claim made against Holiday or 
could defend Holiday to keep such 
obligation from being incurred, (emphasis 
added.) 
This admission is compelled by the dearth of evidence of 
a first-party, insured-insurer relationship between Holiday and 
Home. Indeed, all evidence is to the contrary, including: (1) 
The principals of Holiday testified that they had no contacts 
or dealings with representatives of Home. (Deposition of David 
Lingard, pp. 23-24, 25-26, R2 506-7; Deposition of Don Maw, pp. 
7-8, R2 508-9; Affidavit of Craig Lingard, R2 510; testimony of 
John Lingard, pp. 8-10, 29, 39, R2 513-20.) (2) The under-
writing representative of Home Insurance Company, Mr. James 
Guthrie, testified that at no time was an application for 
insurance received by Home from Holiday. (R2 258-60.) (3) The 
independent agent assisting Airport Shuttle, Mr. Gene Denning, 
testified that no application or request for insurance with 
Home was ever submitted on behalf of Holiday. (Deposition of 
Gene Denning, pp. 52-53, R2 530.) (4) And the principals of 
Home's insured, Airport, have consistently testified that at no 
time did the approach Home for the purpose of extending Home's 
policy to cover Holiday as a tenant of the business premises. 
(Affidavits of Harold Hinckley and Rex Howell, R2 219, 221.) 
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In summary, no facts have been produced, either below or 
in this appeal, for finding a first-party relationship of 
insurer-insured between Home and either Christiansen or 
Holiday. 
2. No Basis Exists to Imply a Contract of 
Insurance. 
An implied contract or estoppel theory can be summarily 
dismissed because the complaint against Home fails to allege 
either theory. (See Complaint in Civil No. C86-7570, R2 2-32.) 
Accordingly, it would be appropriate for this court to 
disregard such theories as may be raised in this appeal. 
Banqerter v. Poulton, 663 P.2d 100, 102 (Utah 1983). 
Should this court consider the merits of such theories, 
the facts set forth above establish a lack of contact between 
Home and either Christiansen or Holiday on the subject of Home 
providing insurance for the benefit of Holiday. Christiansen 
urges that such a contract of insurance can be found in (1) 
representations or conduct of Home's representatives or 
attorneys or (2) in the coverage provided by the contractual 
liability provision of Home's policy with Airport. 
As to the first argument, Christiansen cites the 
independent insurance agent, Gene Denning, as the only source 
of a statement or conduct occurring before the accident to 
Christiansen. Home has always maintained that nothing 
represented by Mr. Denning can be binding upon Home. Denning 
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described himself as a "broker" acting on behalf of his clients 
Howell and Hinckley. (Deposition of Gene Denning, pp. 18, 57, 
R2 521-35.) Denning was an independent agent with no 
individual authority from Home. (Denning Deposition, pp. 
35-36, 39, R2 521-35.) 
As such, Mr. Denning, if anything, is the agent of the 
insureds, not Home. See Vina v. Jefferson Ins. Co. of N.Y., 
761 P.2d 581 (Utah App. 1988), and S31A-1-301 (42) (43) , Utah 
Code Annotated (1953 as amended). 
However, further assuming that statements by Denning could 
attributed to Home, there is no evidence that such statements 
were made to Christiansen or Holiday. There is also no 
evidence that they relied upon such statements or conduct. Mr. 
Denning made it clear in his deposition that his only contacts 
were with Messrs. Howell and Hinckley of Airport. He also 
stated that his "suggestions" as to how coverage might be 
extended to include Holiday were not adopted: 
Q. (By Mr. King) As the agent, this 
is what you advised them, is it not? 
A. Well, frankly, the way the lease 
agreement is worded/ Sam, I donft agree 
with you because there isn't an assumption 
of liability under the lease agreement. 
There is simply an assumption of premium 
payments. (emphas is added.) 
(Deposition of Gene Denning, p. 21, R2 521.) 
All other statements and conduct relied on by Christiansen 
to support an estoppel or implied contract theory occurred ex 
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post facto. That is, all the "examples" cited in her brief 
were after the eiccident and during this litigation. This 
includes the tender by Home of payment for the judgment amount 
of $15,000 plus attorneyfs fees. Therefore, Christiansen can 
show no reliance on such statements or conduct to her 
detriment. Lack of detrimental reliance is fatal to a claim of 
estoppel. Blackhurst v. Transamerica Ins. Co., 699 P.2d 688 
(Utah 1985); Triple I Supply, Inc. v. Sunset Rail, Inc., 652 
P.2d 1298 (Utah 1982); United America Life Ins. Co. v. Zions 
First National Bank 641 P.2d 158 (Utah 1982). 
Christiansen next argues that there is "coverage" for 
Holiday under the contractual liability provisions of Home's 
policy with Airport. This argument plainly manifests 
Christiansen's confusion between coverage for a given claim and 
status as an insured. As stated by District Court Judge Scott 
Daniels in his Memorandum Decision of April 13, 1989: 
The distinction is subtle, but important: 
Home does not insure Holiday for 
Christiansen1s claim against Holiday, but 
it does insure Airport for Holiday's claim 
against Airport. 
The reason the distinction is 
important is that Home, not insuring 
Holiday, does not owe Holiday a duty to 
defend, duties of good faith, or other 
duties an insurer owes to its insured,, 
The contractual liability coverage afforded by Home's 
policy arises as an exception to a policy exclusion. It is 
found at page 10 of Home's policy as Exclusion (e): 
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Under Coverage E, to liability assumed by 
the insured under any contract or 
agreement except an insured contract; but 
this exclusion does not apply to reliance 
upon a representation or warranty made 
with respect to the Named Insured's 
product or work performed by or on behalf 
of the Named Insured; (emphasis added.) 
Thus, it is the "insured contract" of the "named insured" 
to which this coverage applies. Nothing in Home's contractual 
liability coverage promotes Holiday to the status of "an 
insured." 
As discussed above, there is no basis to find either 
Christiansen or Holiday to be "named insureds." The 
distinction that has eluded Christiansen is that although there 
may be "coverage" for Holiday's breach of contract claim 
against Airport under Home's policy, such coverage does not 
make Holiday an insured of Home. This reasoning, though 
simple, defeats Christiansen's entire case against Home. 
B. There is No Liability on the Part of Home Absent a 
Contract of Insurance With Christiansen or Holiday. 
It has been shown that no factual basis exists to 
establish a contract of insurance between Home and either 
Christiansen or Holiday from whom Christiansen takes by way of 
assignment. Neither can such a contractual relationship be 
implied from any of the statements or conduct of the parties. 
Utah case law consistently holds that the absence of an 
insured-insurer relationship is an absolute barrier to a claim 
by a third-party against the wrongdoer's liability insurer. 
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Lack of privity of contract was a bar to the claim of a 
judgment creditor against the judgment debtor's liability 
insurer in Ammerman v. Farmers Ins. Exchange, 19 Utah 2d 261, 
430 P.2d 576 (Utah 1967). Also, in Campbell v. Staqq, 596 P.2d 
1037 (Utah 1979), this court described the legal impediment to 
such a claim as follows: 
In Utah, a plaintiff must direct his 
action against the actual tort-feasor, not 
the insurer. The fact that plaintiff 
signed a release agreement which named the 
insurer as a releasee does not change the 
nature of the rights between plaintiff and 
the insurer; plaintiff has no direct cause 
of action against the insurer which he 
could release. Plaintifffs only cause of 
action lies against defendant, which is an 
action in tort. 
596 P.2d at 1039. 
Additional Utah case authority requiring privity of 
contract in an action against the liability insurer includes: 
Auerbach Co. v. Key Security Policy, Inc., 680 P.2d 740 (Utah 
1984), note 3 at p. 743; and Young v. Barney, 20 Utah 2d 108, 
433 P.2d 846 (1967). See also, opinion of the Utah Court of 
Appeals in Arnica Mut. Ins. Co. v. Schettler, 768 P. 2d 950 (Utah 
App. 1989.) 
This court has also held that liability insurance 
contracts cannot be construed as being third-party beneficiary 
contracts for the benefit of injured third-party claimants. As 
stated in Dairvland Ins. Corp. v. Smith, 646 P. 2d 737 (Utah 
1982) : 
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The Halls [injured third parties] also 
challenged the dismissal of their 
counterclaim and cross claim relying upon 
[case citation omitted], for support. 
[That case] held that an injured third 
party should be treated as a third-party 
beneficiary under the tort-feasor's 
insurance contract. This is not the law 
in this jurisdiction and will not be 
relied upon by this court to reverse the 
trial court's decision, (emphasis added.) 
646 P.2d at 740. 
Christiansen is properly seen as the employee of Home's 
insured who never has asserted a direct claim against the named 
insured. This is because as an employee of Airport, her claim 
would be statutorily barred under U.C.A. §35-1-60. As to 
Holiday, again there is no evidence of a contractual 
relationship with Home. Thus, assignment of Holiday's "rights" 
to Christiansen adds nothing to her standing viz-a-viz Home. 
Having established that no privity of contract exists, the 
claims asserted in the complaint against Home will be reviewed 
seriatim. In each instance, the claim fails due to the lack of 
a first-party relationship. 
1. Fraud and Misrepresentation. 
The first theories that can be inferred from the complaint 
are for fraud and misrepresentation. It is apparent that the 
"fraud" Home is alleged to have committed is in denying the 
tender of defense submitted by Holiday when sued by 
Christiansen. Such a claim of fraud is disposed of by the 
19 
validity of Home's position that it did not insure Holiday. 
Absent a falsehood, there can be no claim for fraud or 
misrepresentation. Sugarhouse Finance Co. v. Anderson, 610 
P.2d 1369 (Utah 1980). See also, Taylor v. Gasor, Inc., 607 
P.2d 293 (Utah 1980), and Schwartz v. Tanner, 576 P.2d 873 
(Utah 1978). In Sugarhouse Finance Co., this court addressed 
the requirements for fraud and misrepresentation: 
A finding of fraud requires a showing of a 
false representation of an existing 
material fact, made knowingly or 
recklessly for the purpose of inducing 
reliance thereon upon which plaintiff 
reasonably relies to his detriment. 
Misrepresentation may be made either by 
affirmative statement or by material 
omission, where there exists a duty to 
speak. (emphasis added.) 
610 P.2d at 1373. 
2. Insurer Bad Faith. 
To state the claim merely begs the question; was Home the 
insurer of Holiday or Christiansen? The answer has heretofore 
been shown to be an unequivocal "no". Absent such a first-
party relationship, there can be no claim since this theory 
sounds exclusively in contract. See Beck v. Farmers Ins. 
Exchange 701 P.2d 795 (Utah 1985). 
The ruling of this court in Beck was applied by the Utah 
Court of Appeals in Arnica Mut. Ins. v. Schettler to uphold 
dismissal of a claim of insurer bad faith where it was shown 
that no such privity of contract or first-party relationship 
20 
existed at the time of the alleged bad faith conduct. Also 
citing the earlier decision of this court in Ammerman v. 
Farmers Ins. Exchange, supra, and of the Oklahoma Supreme Court 
in Allstate Ins. Co. v. Amick, 680 P.2d 362, 364 (Okla. 1984), 
the court in Arnica held: 
In order to maintain an action under a 
contractual theory of insurer bad faith, 
the parties must be in privity of contract 
at the time of the alleged wrong, 
(emphasis added.) 
768 P.2d at 958. 
3. Infliction of Emotional Distress. 
The next theory that can be deduced from the complaint is 
for infliction of emotional distress. Here again, the veracity 
of Home's position in denying coverage to Holiday as an 
insured, is a bar to such a claim. 
Moreover, under standards adopted by this court, the 
conduct of Home in not extending "insured" status to Holiday, 
even if incorrect, could not constitute conduct of such an 
outrageous nature to be actionable. This court in Larson v. 
Sysco Corp., 767 P.2d 557 (Utah 1989), readopted the standard 
first applied in Samms v. Eccles, 11 Utah 2d 289, 358 P.2d 344 
(1961). There it was held that a plaintiff must show: 
The defendant intentionally engaged in 
some conduct toward the plaintiff, (a) 
with the purpose of inflicting emotional 
distress, or, (b) where any reasonable 
person would have known that such would 
result; and his actions are of such a 
nature as to be considered outrageous and 
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intolerable in that they offend against 
the generally accepted standards of 
decency and morality. 
11 Utah 2d at 293, 358 P.2d at 347. 
Although this court has relaxed the requirement that the 
conduct be "intentional", it is still true that the conduct 
complained of must be "intolerable" or "extreme" in nature. In 
the present case, not only did Home have a good faith basis for 
refusing to extend its policy to include Holiday as an insured, 
but Holiday has failed to show justification, in fact or law, 
why it should be regarded as Home's insured. 
4. Breach of Contract and Breach of Fiduciary 
Duties. 
The final two theories are for breach of contract and 
breach of fiduciary duties. Dismissal is self-evident given 
the lack of privity of contract running between Home and either 
Christiansen or Holiday. 
POINT II. 
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY MEASURED THE 
DAMAGES TO BE AWARDED HOLIDAY. 
Christiansen claims that the trial court erred in awarding 
$15,000 plus attorneyfs fees instead of approximately $246,000. 
This award was made based on the third-party action by Holiday 
against Airport for breach of the agreement to provide 
liability insurance. It is undisputed that Holiday paid only 
$15,000 to Airport under the terms of the settlement agreement. 
The amount Christiansen seeks to recover was uncontested by 
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Holiday under the terms of the settlement agreement between 
Holiday and Christiansen. 
This respondent incorporates by reference and adopts the 
points and authorities contained in the brief of respondent 
Airport Shuttle Parking on the issue of the correct measure of 
damages. However, in the interest of a final resolution of 
this matter, Home will show that the damages awarded by Judge 
Daniels were correctly measured. 
Utah case law has adopted various descriptions of the 
measure of damages in a breach of contract action. However, 
regardless of the specific wording of the formula, the result 
in the present case is the same. 
In Young Electric Sign Co. v. United Std. West, Inc. 755 
P.2d 162 (Utah 1988), the court announced the formula for 
determining breach of contract damages as follows: 
In general, the contractual damages are 
measured by the lost benefit of the 
bargain, i.e., by "the amount necessary to 
place the non-breaching party in as good a 
position as if the contract had been 
performed." 
755 P.2d at 164. 
Applying this formula to the present case, it is clear 
that Holiday would be in the same position had the contract 
been performed by the award set by the court, that is, $15,000 
plus Holiday's attorney's fees. The same measurement of 
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damages was used by this court in Alexander v. Brown, 646 P.2d 
692 (Utah 1982) . 
Slightly different language was used by this court in 
Keller v. Deseret Mortuary Co., 23 Utah 2d 1, 455 P.2d 197 
(1969), where it is stated: 
The non-breaching party should receive the 
award which will put him in as good a 
position as he would have been in had 
there been no breach of contract. 
455 P.2d at 198. Again, application of this standard produces 
the result reached by the trial court. It is important to note 
that the "non-breaching party" in this case is Holiday, not 
Christiansen. Accordingly, there can be no basis to award more 
than $15,000 plus attorney's fees since it is Holiday to be 
compensated, not Christiansen. 
A Wisconsin case is factually very similar to the one 
under appeal and further demonstrates the correctness of the 
trial court's award. In Bentley v. Favas, 260 Wis. 177, 50 
N.W.2d 404 (1951), the owner of an orchard contracted with the 
defendant to drive laborers to the owner's orchard. As a part 
of the agreement, the owner agreed to provide defendant with 
liability insurance. An accident resulted and defendant became 
liable to various laborers who sustained injuries. Although 
the owner had not obtained the insurance agreed upon, 
defendant's liability was paid for under his own automobile 
liability insurance policy. Notwithstanding, defendant claimed 
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that the owner was liable for the failure to obtain the 
insurance. The Wisconsin Supreme Court disagreed holding that 
"the liability of one who breaches a contract to procure 
insurance is to pay damages, and is not that of an insurer." 
50 N.W.2d at 409. The court then reasoned that since defendant 
had sustained no out-of-pocket damages, there could be no 
recovery. 
Given that the claim upon which the damages in this action 
are premised is the third-party breach of contract claim by 
Holiday against Airport, there is no justification for an award 
in excess of Holiday's actual damages, i.e., $15,000 plus 
attorney's fees. It is undisputed that this amount has been 
tendered to Christiansen as assignee of Holiday. 
CONCLUSION 
This respondent submits that resolution of this appeal is 
not complicated. The simple truth is that Home did not insure 
Christiansen nor did it insure Holiday. No factual basis 
exists to find an express contract of insurance. Likewise, no 
factual basis exists to find an implied contract nor to apply 
the doctrine of promissory estoppel. Appellants' argument 
notwithstanding, nothing stated by Home or its representatives 
creates a contractual relationship. Appellants' arguments also 
fail because the alleged representations and contacts were 
either subsequent to Christiansen's injury or not relied upon 
by Christiansen or Holiday. 
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This court should affirm the trial court's award of 
damages in the amount of $15,000 plus attorney's fees. That 
amount is the correct measure of the damages actually sustained 
by Holiday in consequence of Airport's breach of the agreement 
to provide liability insurance. A higher award of damages 
would be superlative to the loss sustained by Holiday. 
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ADDENDUM 
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED §35-1-60 — 
35-1-60. Exclusive remedy against employer, or officer, agent 
or employee -- Occupational disease excepted. 
The right to recover compensation pursuant to the 
provisions of this title for injuries sustained by an employee, 
whether resulting in death or not, shall be the exclusive 
remedy against the employer and shall be the exclusive remedy 
against any officer, agent or employee of the employer and the 
liabilities of the employer imposed by this act shall be in 
place of any and all other civil liability whatsoever, at 
common law or otherwise, to such employee or-to his spouse, 
widow, children, parents, dependents, next of kin, heirs, 
personal representatives, guardian, or any other person 
whomsoever, on account of any accident or injury or death, in 
any way contracted, sustained, aggravated or incurred by such 
employee in the course of or because of or arising out of his 
employment, and no action at law may be maintained against an 
employer or against any officer, agent or employee of the 
employer based upon any accident, injury or death or an 
employee. Nothing in this section, however, shall prevent an 
employee (or his dependents) from filing a claim with the 
industrial commission of Utah for compensation in those cases 
with the provisions of the Utah Occupational Disease Disability 
Act, as amended. 
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, S31A-1-301(42) — 
(42) "Insurance agent" or "agent" means a person who 
represents insurers in soliciting, negotiating, or placing 
insurance. Refer to Subsection 31A-23-102(3) for exceptions to 
this definition. 
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, §31a-l-301(43) — 
(43) "Insurance broker" or "broker" means a person who 
acts in procuring insurance on behalf of an applicant for 
insurance or an insured, and does not act on behalf of the 
insurer except by collecting premiums or performing other 
ministerial acts. Refer also to Subsection 31A-23-102(3) for 
exceptions to this definition. 
RULE 56. SUMMARY JUDGMENT. 
(a) For claimant. A party seeking to recover upon a 
claim, counterclaim or cross-claim or to obtain a declaratory 
judgment may, at any time after the expiration of 20 days from 
the commencement of the action or after service of a motion for 
summary judgment by the adverse party, move with or without 
supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in his favor upon 
all or any part thereof. 
(b) For defending party. A party against whom a claim, 
counterclaim, or cross-claim is asserted or a declaratory 
judgment is sought, may, at any time, move with or without 
supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in his favor as to 
all or any part thereof. 
(c) Motion and proceedings thereon. The motion shall be 
served at least 10 days before the time fixed for the hearing, 
the adverse party prior to the day of hearing may serve 
opposing affidavits. The judgment sought shall be rendered 
forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to 
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the 
affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to 
any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a 
judgment as a matter of law. A summary judgment, interlocutory 
in character, may be rendered on the issue of liability aline 
although there is a genuine issue as to the amount of damages. 
(d) Case not fully adjudicated on motion. If on motion 
under this rule judgment is not rendered upon the whole case or 
for all the relief asked and a trial is necessary, the court at 
the hearing of the motion, by examining the pleadings and the 
evidence before it and by interrogating counsel, shall if 
practicable ascertain what material facts exist without 
substantial controversy and what material facts are actually 
and in good faith controverted. It shall thereupon make an 
order specifying the facts that appear without substantial 
controversy, including the extent to which the amount of 
damages or other relief is not in controversy, and directing 
such further proceedings in the action as are just. Upon the 
trial of the action the fact so specified shall be deemed 
established, and the trial shall be conducted accordingly. 
(e) Form of affidavits; further testimony; defense 
required. Supporting and opposing affidavits shall be made on 
personal knowledge, shall set forth such facts as would be 
admissible in evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the 
affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated therein. 
Sworn or certified copies of all papers or parts thereof 
referred to in an affidavit shall be attached thereto or served 
therewith. The court may permit affidavits to be supplemented 
or opposed by depositions, answers to interrogatories, or 
further affidavits. When a motion for summary judgment is made 
and supported as provided in this rule, an adverse party may 
not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of his pleadings, 
but his response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in 
this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that there is 
a genuine issue for trial. If he does not so respond, summary 
judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered against him. 
(f) When affidavits are unavailable. Should it appear 
from the affidavits of a party opposing the motion that he 
cannot for reasons stated present by affidavit facts essential 
to justify his opposition, the court may refuse the application 
for judgment or may order a continuance to permit affidavits to 
be obtained or depositions to be taken or discovery to be had 
or may make such other order as is just. 
(g) Affidavits made in bad faith. Should it appear to 
the satisfaction of the court at any time that any of the 
affidavits presented pursuant to this rule are presented in bad 
faith or solely for the purpose of delay, the court shall 
forthwith order the party employing them to pay to the other 
party the amount of the reasonable expenses which the filing of 
the affidavits caused him to incur, including reasonable 
attorney's fees, and any offending party or attorney may be 
judged guilty of contempt. 
